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In the era of globalization with its ever increasing competitive pressure on firms and their 
employees new knowledge – and particularly new technical knowledge - has become the most 
important production factor. Moreover, the way that new technical knowledge itself is 
produced has rapidly changed in recent years: Knowledge production becomes more and 
more complex, such that more and more people have to interact in this specific production 
process and the halflife period of new technical knowledge becomes shorter and shorter which 
means that enterprises that want to stay on top have to speed up the process of knowledge 
production. These fundamental changes in the way that new technology is produced challenge 
traditional technology policy approaches and c all for policy innovations (Dohse 2001). 
Indeed, as the OECD has documented, in most industrialized countries policymakers try – 
more or less successfully – to reform their traditional technology policy approaches (OECD 
2000). 
The focus of the current paper is on policy innovations in Germany as German 
technology policy has undergone a particularly remarkable change in recent years: 
Traditionally, the reference units of German technology policy were single firms, 
technologies or sectors. Since the mid-90’s the German Federal Government has discovered 
the region as a new reference unit for technology policy. Policy instruments such as the 
‘Bioregio contest’, the ‘City Contest Multimedia’ or the ‘Competition of Nanotechnology 
Competence Centers’ have drawn a l ot of attention nationally as well as internationally. In 
contrast to these early instruments that were restricted to single technologies, the newly 
established ‘InnoRegio contest’ encompasses different fields of technology but is 
geographically restricted to east Germany.  
As the aim of the paper is to come to a general assessment of the new region-oriented 
technology policy in Germany rather than to discuss each single policy instrument that 
belongs to this category the discussion is focused on the two prototype models of the new 
region-oriented technology policy, namely the BioRegio contest and the InnoRegio contest. 
Before analyzing and comparing these prototype models in detail it is necessary  to define 
what is meant by region-oriented technology policy in the context of this paper:  In an 
important article on the Japanese “Technopolis” initiative Sternberg has defined  region-
oriented technology policy (ROTP, for short) as “… a national technology policy pursuing   3
spatial goals” (Sternberg 1995). We use a slightly different definition, i.e. we understand 
region-oriented technology policy as a national technology policy making use of the regional 
level in order to pursue national goals. ROTP in Germany in the above-mentioned sense 
focusses on three targets: generating regional high-tech clusters, stimulating interregional 
competition for technology, and improving the well-functioning of regional innovation 
systems (Dohse 2000a). 
 
II. Prototype I: BioRegio 
Aims and conceptual design 
  Compared to other countries, especially the US and the UK, biotechnology had a slow 
start in risk averse Germany. Falling behind in a so-called ‘generic’ high tech industry was a 
matter of serious concern for German policymakers in the early 90’s. Therefore, the BioRegio 
contest was designed to transform a dormant sector into one intended to be globally 
competitive by stimulating biotech firm start ups, the growth of existing companies and the 
provision of venture capital (BMBF 1997).
1  
  All regions wishing to participate in the contest had to give a presentation of their 
respective strengths in biotech from the lab bench to the market as well as proposals for future 
development of biotechnology in the region. An independent jury was installed by the Federal 
Research Ministry to f ind the three best organised regions with the most promising 




The number and the internal structure of the regions participating in the contest was 
not predetermined by the Federal Research Ministry, nor were the institutions taking the lead 
in the formation of the BioRegios. In some regions the local or state governments coordinated 
the regions’ activities, in other cases it was industry or research institutions themselves. In all 
regions enterprises, research institutes and government officals cooperated very closely. 
  All in all, 17 BioRegios formed to participate in the contest, although the number of 
potential participants could have been higher.
2 Map 1 shows how heterogeneous the 
participants in the contest are:  Some of them are single cities (and their hinterland) such as 
Freiburg (3), Jena (6) or Regensburg (No. 12 in map 1). Others are networks of neighbouring 
                                                 
1 The ambitious long run aim of the contest is to make Germany the number 1 in European biotechnology 
(BMBF 1997). 
2 BMBF officials expected up to 30 regions to participate.   4
cities such as Braunschweig-Göttingen-Hannover (9) or Heidelberg-Mannheim-Ludwigshafen 
(15) or they cover whole federal states such as Berlin-Brandenburg (1). The most populous 
region (Berlin-Brandenburg) has more than six million inhabitants, compared to just a little 




  The three regions selected by the jury as winner regions were Munich (8), Rhineland 
(13), including the cities of Cologne, Aachen, Düsseldorf and Wuppertal, and the Rhine-
Neckar Triangle (15) with Heidelberg, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen. It was pointed out that 
these regions all have a comprehensive scientific basis in modern biotech research, substantial 
enterpreneurial activity in the field of biotechnology and a promising regional development 
concept for biotech industry. The East German region of Jena received a ‘special vote’ for its 
‘especially positive new-orientation’ in the field of biotechnology after re-unification. 
  Being chosen as a ‘model region’ has two advantages: On the one hand, public funds 
amounting to 150 million DM are reserved for the three winners in the BioRegio contest. On 
the other hand, the winning regions receive priority in the appropriation of funds from the 
“Biotechnology 2000“-program of the Federal Research Ministry for a time span of five 
years. The latter advantage seems to be the more important one since the total amount of 
public biotech funding in Germany (about 1.5 billion DM from 1997 to 2001) is about ten 
times higher than the direct BioRegio award and the jury’s judgement on the regions 




The actors’ perspective 
In June 1999 the Kiel Institute performed an e-mail survey among German biotech 
firms (participants in the BioRegio contest and non-participants), trying to shed some more 
light on the strengths and weaknesses of such a region-oriented technology policy instrument 
from the perspective of the actors that perform innovative activities and apply for government 
funding. The aim  of the investigation was not to perform a final and all-comprehensive 
evaluation of the specific BioRegio instrument, but rather to shed some light on the more 
basic question if - and to what extent - it makes sense to include the regional level into 
national technology policy making. Therefore, we gave prominence to what may be called the 
                                                 
3 Considering institutional funding and the financing of research institutes, the total amount of government 
funding for biotechnology is even higher (approximately 1 billion DM in 1998).   5
‘strategic efficiency’ of the instrument (i.e. checking whether the assumptions on which the 
BioRegio instrument is based are appropriate in their perception of problems and causes) 
rather than checking its ‘operative efficiency’ (the concrete implementation and 





  The BioRegio instrument is widely known and quite well accepted by the German 
biotech community, although - not surprisingly - the assessment varies between those who 
receive funding from the programme and those who don’t. The assumption underlying the 
BRC
5 that there was a technology gap between Germany and the leading biotech nations (the 
US and the UK) when the BRC started in the mid 90’s was shared by all 33 respondents; 79 
% of the responding firms found this to be definitely true, 21 % answered that this was partly 
true (Dohse 2000b: 1124). Such a gap was identified primarily in applied r esarch and 
commercialisation, less so in basic research. A vast majority of firms believe that the 
competitive stance of the German biotech industry has - at least in part - improved since the 
contest started.    
 
  The firms’ assessment concerning the most important obstacles to biotech innovation 
in Germany (table 2) lends support to the thesis that the problems addressed by the BRC 
(insufficient technology transfer between firms and universities, lacking communication and 
cooperation among the regional key actors,
6 lacking acceptance of biotech in the public) are 
of paramount importance, although the important problem of over-regulation is only partly (as 
far as the regional level is concerned) and indirectly addressed by the BRC. By contrast, lack 
of public funding and lack of venture capital seem to be of less importance and only a 
minority of firms views lack of highly qualified researchers as an effective obstacle to biotech 
innovation in Germany. Comparing our results with an earlier survey among small and 
medium-sized biotech firms (FhG ISI 1995) indicates that problems of venture capital and 
finance (ranking high in the ISI study) have become less acute in recent years, which is in 
                                                 
4 We tried to keep the questionaire as short as possible and renounced on asking questions concerning 
confidential or firm-specific matters in order to secure an acceptable return.  33 questionaires (33 %) were 
returned to us. 75 % of the responding firms participated actively in the Bioregio contest and half of them 
received funding from the BioRegio programme. About 25 % of all respondents are located outside the 
BioRegios and have neither participated nor received funding. These are referred to as ‘non-participants’ in the 
remainder of this section.        
5 Abbreviation for BioRegio contest. 
6 It’s interesting that the lack of communication and cooperation within the region is especially emphasized by 
the non-participants from outside the BioRegios (table 4). This may indicate that these firms have a locational 
disadvantage further increased by the BioRegio contest.   6






  The most important  advantages of the BioRegio instrument appear to be the 
enhancement of communication and cooperation among the regional key actors, the 
establishment of an innovation prone regional environment, the furthering of research 
cooperation within the BioRegios and the stimulation of interregional competition for 
technology (table 3). Those respondents who named further advantages emphasized the 
‘change of consciousness’ brought about by the BioRegio contest: The regional actors have 
become aware of their region’s potential, the social acceptance of biotech within the regions 





The most important shortcoming of the BioRegio contest - according to the actors’ view - is 
that it misses to reduce regulation at the national level (table 4). Furthermore, it is widely held 
among biotech firms that the ‘picking of winning regions’ may do injury to innovative firms 
located outside the winner regions or even outside any of the 17 BioRegios, and that the new 
instrument neglects the less favored regions at the periphery. The criteria for the selection of 
winning regions are seen quite critically (especially by the ‘non-participants’ from outside the 
BioRegios) and 60% of all respondents (36% of those who receive funding) have the 
impression that the winner regions were known before the contest started. 88% of  the 
responding firms (even 75% of those who receive funding) agree that the BRC leads - at least 
partly - to free rider effects and still 36 % of all respondents are critical about the efficiency of 




  A vast majority of firms (75%) views the BRC as a successful instrument that should 
be continued, and that has helped forward the international competitiveness of German 
                                                 
7 Further obstacles named by the respondents include unfavourable corporate tax legislation in Germany 
(especially concerning ‘stock option’ models for the participation of employees), lack of economic and 
marketing skills of university researchers and a hostile environment to innovation and firm start-ups.   7
biotech industry (table 5). It is interesting that even those firms which don’t receive funding  
view the BRC as a success story: 70 % of them say that the BRC has been successful and 
should be continued with and an even higher percentage (90 %) say that the BRC has reached 
its objective to help forward the competitiveness of German biotech industry. 72 % of all 
responding firms agree that the BRC has contributed to a considerable job creation and an 
even higher percentage of respondents agree that it has contributed to an improved venture 
capital provision. This is in accordance with the fact that the number of venture capitalists 
engaged in biotechnology grew in number from two in the 1980’s to more than seventy by 
2000 (Cooke 2002: 172).  
[Table 5] 
 
  A majority of all respondents believes that the BioRegio funding does not reach the 
most innovative biotech firms (table 5); however this result varies strongly between the sub-
groups: from those firms that receive funding from the BioRegio-programme 72,7 % 
answered that the BioRegio funding reaches the most innovative firms whereas of those firms 
that don’t receive funding it is just 23,5 %. 
  Interregional competition for scarce public funding is viewed as a means of enhancing 
the efficiency of technology policy by a majority of firms, although this result isn’t robust: 
Among those who were successful in attracting funding it is 75% that agree, among those 
who don’t receive funding it is only  47  %. 
Some respondents made suggestions about what should be changed (or could be 
improved) with the BioRegio instrument. Three firms claimed that the BRC should be 
succeeded (or complemented) by an integrated national concept for the support of biotech 
innovation. Others suggested to give up the restriction on regions or to make sure that each 
innovative firm can be associated with a Bioregio in order to prevent discrimination. Finally it 
was suggested to better consider recent trends in the BioRegios (i.e. to shuffle the cards new 
each year) and to give more weight to a region’s development potential than to the already 
existing structures. 
 
The German biotech industry before and after the contest    
In recent years the number of biotech firms increased more rapidly in Germany than in 
any other European country and the most firm start-ups could be observed in the 17 regions 
participating in the BioRegio contest. In 1999, i.e. four years after the BioRegio contest 
started, Germany surpassed the UK and for the first time rated number 1 in European 
biotechnology according to the number of firms. In 2001 the number of German biotech firms   8
was 330, compared to (approximately) 270 in the UK and less than 200 in France: “Germany 
can now claim to be Europe’s most densely populated biotech kindergarten” (Ernst & Young 
2001: 5). Nevertheless, taking the size and maturity of the companies into account, the UK is 
still dominating the European biotech sector, although Germany is also catching up according 
to these criteria (Ernst & Young 2000, 2001).  
A closer look at the current biotech map of Germany shows that a quite impressive 
biotech sector is emerging and that there is a strong tendency towards clustering. Up to now, 
seven larger biotech clusters have developed in Germany: The three winning regions Munich, 
Rhine-Neckar Triangle and Rhineland; the Berlin area, the Hamburg area, the Frankfurt-
Wiesbaden area and the Freiburg area, which is part of the trinational ‘BioValley upper rhine’
 
8 (Dohse 2000b, Ernst & Young var. issues). Despite its relatively small size BioRegio had an 
important symbolic and practical impact on the German biotech innovation system: “More 
than any other federal initiative  it has produced rapid, positive results and galvanized 
entrepreneurship in respect of new firm formation, also giving a significant boost to 
Germany’s lagging venture capital industry.” (Cooke 2002: 171) 
 
III.  Prototype II: InnoRegio 
 
While the major aim of BioRegio was to initiate a catch up process in a generic high 
tech industry the main objective of InnoRegio is to close – or at least to reduce – the regional 
innovation and development gap between east and west Germany. Indeed, one may argue that 
InnoRegio with it’s budget of 500 million DM is an important building block in the Federal 
government’s strategy of  “rebuilding the East”. 
InnoRegios are, according to a definition by the Federal Research Ministry, regional 
units, smaller than states (Bundesländer) in which people and institutions from private 
enterprises, science, education, policy, administration and private organizations cooperate in 
order to generate technical, economic and social innovations (BMBF 1999:6). 
There were 444 rather heterogenous projects that participated in the so-called 
‘qualifying phase’ of the InnoRegio contest that lastet from April till October 1999. The 
applicants had to present their regional innovation profile, to outline the expected revenue that 
the InnoRegio funding would generate in their respective region and to explain their strategy 
of network-building and intra-regional cooperation in later stages of the contest. From these 
more than 400 applications an independent jury selected 25 approaches. Selection criteria 
were, according to the Federal Research Ministry, the origininality of the approaches, the 
                                                 
8 The upper rhine region consists of the Freiburg area in Germany, the Alsace in France and the Basel area in 
Switzerland.   9
sustainability of intra-regional cooperation and the expected revenue of funding for the 
respective region (BMBF 1999). It seems, however, that regional proportionality aspects have 
also played a major role in the jury’s decision as the percentage of winner regions from a state 
is commensurate with the percentage of applications from this state




The winning projects got the privilege to participate in the second phase (the so-called 
development phase) of the contest. Each of them received up to 300.000 DM for the 
development of a realization concept that had to be presented until summer 2000. These 




When comparing these criteria to the selection criteria of the BioRegio contest it becomes 
quite obvious that the existing hardware (number and size of existing companies and research 
institutions in the region) that dominated the BioRegio decision steps back in favour of what 
may be called the ‘software’, i.e. development concepts for the future, originality of the 
approaches and networking strategies. The concepts chosen on the basis of the criteria in table 
7 get generous funding (up to 500 million DM) in the third, so-called realization phase of the 
contest. 
 
Common Features and Differences  
 
What do BioRegio and InnoRegio have in common and what are the differences? At first 
glance, both instruments might seem rather similar: Both aim at stimulating the clustering of 
innovative activities and inducing a technology push, not only in those regions that receive 
funding but in the country as a whole. Both address the regional level in order to pursue 
national goals. The national goal behind the BioRegio contest is making Germany the number 
1 in European biotechnology whereas in the case of InnoRegio it is rebuilding the German 
East. Both instruments are designed as an invitation to competition between regions and 
employ independent jurys as referees to find the winners, and both pursue a strategy of 
improving the scope and quality of cooperation within regional innovation systems. 
 
                                                 
9 The city of Berlin is the only exception.   10
 [Table 8] 
 
However, a closer look reveals substantial differences: While BioRegio starts from the 
premise that biotechnology is a key technology of the 21
st century and the necessity of federal 
funding is derived from the expectation of substantial positive externalities of biotechnology, 
InnoRegio is not focussed on a specific technology but funds a wide variety of projects 
ranging from modern information technologies and innovative educational projects to specific 




The regional focus of InnoRegio is restricted to east Germany, whereas no regions 
were excluded ex ante (there was no ‘closed shop’) from the BioRegio contest. The 
participants in the BioRegio contest were whole cities or networks of cities whereas the 
participants in the InnoRegio contest are in fact no regions at all but rather single projects or 
institutions within these regions. This might explain why there was a large number of 
participants in the InnoRegio contest compared to a relatively small number of BioRegio 
participants. The decisive criteria in the BioRegio decision were ‘hardware criteria’ ( existing 
firms and research facilities located in the region), whereas ‘soft factors’ gained more 
prominence in the InnoRegio decision.  
The major difference between the two contests is, however, their different philosophy 
concerning the actual goals of technology policy. The objective of BioRegio is increasing 
Germany’s international competitiveness in a generic technology, i.e. BioRegio pursuits a 
clear-cut national growth objective. In contrast, InnoRegio tries to pursuit two goals in one, 
namely regional income convergence and national growth, and it is hard to make out which is 
the dominant goal. 
  
IV. Strengths of the new Policies 
Taking regions seriously    
A major policy innovation that distinguishes ROTP from the traditional technology policy 
pursued in Germany is that the new approaches are taking regions seriously. The role of the 
regions is not a passive one, they are not mere recipients of public funding – as is the case in 
traditional regional policy - but they are active players in the innovation process. A central 
hypothesis of this section is that there are indeed good - theoretical as well as empirical – 
reasons for taking regions seriously:   11
   
   
•  There can be little doubt that government spending in the past has generated 
unintended spatial effects that have been far more consequential than the intended 
effects (cf. Sternberg 1996, Sternberg 2002:10). Furthermore, we know that the social 
marginal return of federal R&D investment is typically much higher in technologically 
strong regions than in technologically weak regions. Thus, it makes sense to exploit 
the spatial differentiation of a county in order to foster national technological 
competitiveness (Dohse 1998, Cooke 2002, Sternberg 2002). 
•  A slightly different line of argumentation is the following: in the age of progressive 
globalization certain factors of production become essentially ubiquitious. Thus, the 
factors that give producers a competitive advantage are not those which are 
ubiquitiously available but those which are bound to a specific location. Storper 
(1995b) speaks of ‘untraded interdependencies’ that characterize a region. These 
‘untraded interdependencies’ are not static and irreversible but endogenous to political 
action such as the BioRegio or InnoRegio contest. 
•  A third line of argumentation views the regions as governance levels best suited to 
internalize knowledge spillovers. Empirical studies suggest that knowledge spillovers 
are localized (Jaffee et al. 1993) and that intrasectoral spillovers seem to be of less 
importance than intersectoral spillovers (Glaeser et al. 1992). This calls for a shift of 
focus from the national to the regional level and for performing a region-oriented 
rather than a sector oriented policy. 
 
The recent innovations in German technology policy may also be seen as an attempt to 
build up sustainable ‘regional innovation systems’, a notion that was suggested just recently 
by Cooke et al. 1997 and Braczyk et al. 1998. Regional innovation systems are conceptualized 
as systems of collective order based on mutual understanding, trust and reciprocity among the 
members of the regional innovation community (Cooke 1998: 16). The regions themselves 
are viewed as places of collective technological learning and technological competence is 
seen as a regionally developed and rooted asset (Braczyk and Heidenreich 1998: 416). The 
new policies fit quite well into the regional innovation system concept as they share the 
assumption that the regional environment is crucial for the innovation process and aim at   12
fostering the establishment of a collective order of trust and reciprocity within the regions that 
may help overcome obstacles to innovation.
10  
  In fact, the BioRegio (less so the InnoRegio) contest also comes quite close to another 
theoretical concept, that of functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions (FOCJ), 
suggested by Frey and Eichenberger (1995). The BioRegios formed spontaneously - although 
on the basis of already existing structures - and are in principle functional (single purpose) 
regions. They compete with each other for public funding, mobile inputs, ideas and - in the 
longer run - market shares. Furthermore, they may be seen as overlapping as they need not 
(although they may) be identical with the usual administrative regions, and their composition 
may change with regard to the field of technology they try to promote or the kind of public 
good they offer. FOCJs  have  various advantages (Frey and Eichenberger 1995: 218): 
-  they are not determined and imposed from outside and above but emerge in response to the 
‘geography of problems’, 
-  as functional regions they have the virtue of minimizing interregional spillovers, 
internalizing intraregional (knowledge) spillovers and of exploiting economies of scale, 
-  they stimulate the competition between regions which is a competition between 
governments and institutions.  
  While the first two advantages are self-explaining, the last point calls for some more 
elaboration: Why should the competition between regions be a good thing? 
 
 
Stimulating competition among regions 
 
  A possible meaning of interregional competition is that the immobile factors of 
production that are bound to a specific region compete for complementary mobile factors in 
order to raise their marginal product and thus their income. Immobile factors of production 
are land, unskilled labour, regional amenities and so forth whereas capital, skilled labor and - 
perhaps most important - technological knowledge are to a certain degree mobile.
11 Such a 
kind of interregional competition may have positive as well as negative effects. As Krugman 
(1994) has reminded us, the obsession with competitiveness may lead to unhealthy policies 
such as bidding wars and protectionism. On the other hand, interregional competition (in the 
                                                 
10 One should notice, however, that the regional innovation systems that these authors have in mind are not 
restricted to a single technology. 
11 There are, of course, substantial differences in the degree of mobility of different kinds of knowledge. 
Codified knowledge is highly mobile whereas tacit  knowledge sticks (at least temporarily) to particular 
individuals and regions.    13
sense of a competition among governments, representing the immobile factors) may help to 
break up Olson-type institutional sclerosis, to re-shape the regional production system and to 
contest the cartel of the ‘classe politique’. Institutional competition may be seen as an 
experimental mode for the discovery of superior institutional arrangements: Without the 
possibility of experimentation and without competition between alternative solutions we had 
no way to find out which institutional arrangements or political orders are best suited to serve 
the interests of a jurisdiction’s citizens (Vanberg 1994: 29). 
 
Reasons for stimulating regional high tech clustering 
 
A core element of region oriented technology policy is the stimulation of regional high 
tech clustering. A necessary – although not sufficient – condition for the success of such a 
policy would be that the regional clustering of innovative activities does indeed yield 
substantial positive externalities. Whether this can be taken for granted is – in view of the 
current clustermania – hardly reflected. In this context, the following euphoric assessment of 
the OECD seems quite typical: ”In many countries, clusters of innovative firms are driving 
growth and employment. Innovative clusters of economic activity are becoming magnets for 
new technology, skilled personnel and research investment. These groups of enterprises tend 
to be well established and stable, innovating through strong backward and forward linkages 
with suppliers and customers“ (OECD 1999: 7).Empirical evidence is, however, sparse and 
covers only single fields of technology. Anyway, there exists evidence that the speed of 
intraregional diffusion of new technology increases with the number of adopters already 
located in the respective region which may be seen as a hint that innovations diffuse faster 
within geographical clusters (Baptista 2000). 
 
V. Problems of the new Policies 
Prototype A: BioRegio   
(i) The philosophy behind the BioRegio contest is strenghtening the strong, dynamic regions 
and thereby improving the competitiveness of the country as a whole. As has been pointed out 
in the literature there is a clear trade off between such a kind of technology policy and 
regional development policy which aims at strengthening the less favoured regions (Dohse 
1998, Temple 1998). However, if the strategy of upgrading national growth regions to 
international growth regions is successful it is likely that this would benefit even peripheral 
regions where technology-based growth cannot be generated at all - or only at prohibitively   14
high costs (Sternberg 2002:13). At least this strategy seems to be the most cost-effective 
policy (ibid).
12 
 (ii) Finding the right criteria to evaluate and compare the regions’ performance in an 
emerging high tech industry is a difficult and thankless task. It’s even more difficult to weight 
these criteria against each other as the weighting scheme predetermines winners and loosers. 
The criteria used by the jury and presented in table 1 may be comprised in three broad 
categories (Dohse 200b: 1122): 
 
a) The already existing hardware , i.e. the stock of firms and research facilities located in the 
region. Criteria c1 and c2 fall in this category.   
b) The political, financial and service environment for biotech development in the region 
(criteria c4, c6, c7 and c9). 
c) The software, encompassing the interaction between researchers of different branches and 
institutions (criteria c3, c8) as well as the strategies to convert know-how into new 
products (c5). Note that the categories b and escpecially c come rather close to Storpers 
notion of ‘untraded interdependencies’. 
 
  More problematic than the choice is the weighting of the criteria
13: The implicit 
weighting scheme used by the jury was not made explicit, although it seems that the already 
existing hardware was the decisive criterion, such that outsiders (regions at the periphery) had 
little chances from the beginning. The result of the contest is, therefore, not very surprising. 
The three winning regions (Munich, Rhineland and the Rhine-Neckar-Triangle) are all located 
in the industrial cores of Germany and accomodate some of the worlds leading life sciences 
and chemical enterprises. The dominance of the ‘existing hardware’ is also evidenced by the 
fact that the winning regions are locations of the so-called gene centres, which had received 
federal funding for several years.   
  It is understandable that the jury gave the highest weight to ‘hard criteria’ as they have 
the advantage of being objectively measurable and comparable. It is in contradiction, 
however, to theories such as Storper’s that emphasize the importance of ‘untraded 
interdepencies’ as the sources of technological change and regional advantage. 
                                                 
12 But even if one accepts the view that the final objective of technology policy should be (national) growth and 
not regional convergence one may ask whether it is not better to subsidize the second best performers who could 
get to the top with these subsidies. This may help to create a greater number of leading regions, which in turn 
may stimulate interregional competition not just for public funding but for the development of new ideas, new 
products and higher income. 
 
13 In principle, the criteria chosen seem to be useful and plausible, although one could imagine further helpful 
criteria such as patent activity on the hardware or business climate on the software side.   15
 
(iii) The BioRegio contest may be seen as an instrument for picking winners in two respects: 
picking a winning technology (biotech) and picking winning regions.
14 The picking of a 
winning technology is problematic because the underlying assumption that this technology 
will create substantial positive externalities in the future is unprovable ex ante which raises 
the obligatory question why one should think that bureaucrats are more clever than the market 
(Hayek 1972). A similar argument holds for the picking of winning regions. The BioRegio 
contest  may be costly (apart from its direct costs i n the form of tax-payers’ money) as it 
fosters the development of some selected regions and suppresses the development of other 
regions, at least in relative terms.  
 
Prototype B: InnoRegio 
While the BioRegio contest obviously pursues a growth objective, the InnoRegio 
contest pursues two objectives at once: overall economic growth and regional convergence. 
On the one hand, it aims at strengthening the innovative potential of Germany as a whole, on 
the other hand, it intends to start a catch-up-process of lagging regions (East Germany vis-à-
vis  West Germany, East German regions with special structural problems vis-à-vis  more 
prosper regions). Achieving both objectives with one single instrument is hardly possible, 
because there is a clear trade-off between  these two objectives: The growth or efficiency 
objective requires to invest taxpayer’s money in those regions in which they yield the highest 
social marginal return. This is usually the case in regions that can already boast with a certain 
amount of research infrastructure and technological competence. Thus, the growth objective 
frequently requires a “strengthening of the strong”, as was the case in the BioRegio contest. 
By contrast, regional convergence demands for the support of regions with structural 
problems which is problematic from an overall economic efficiency point of view. As is well 
documented in the literature, cluster building from a ground zero position is much more likely 
to fail than cluster building promoted from a strong science and financial base (Cooke 2002: 
171). 
A further problem is that the clear orientation of technology policy towards the 
regions, that characterizes the BioRegio contest, has at least partly been lost in the InnoRegio 
contest. While BioRegio addresses the region as a whole (including its local administration, 
its financial institutions etc.) and also intends to promote intraregional competition, the 
                                                 
14 One may also use the less familiar term ‘backing winners’ here, since the selection of winning regions is not a 
fully blind bet but contains a strong element of knowing the good form of contestants before starting the contest.   16
InnoRegio funding is rather oriented towards single actors or innovative projects within the 
regions, such that the frontier towards mere project funding is fuzzy. Thus, the InnoRegio 




A general problem of region-oriented technology policy is the discrimination  of 
innovative enterprises that are located outside the target regions of the respective programs. 
The determination of the adequate level of selectivity in funding is a difficult tight-rope walk: 
A clear-cut technological (and regional) focus as in the BioRegio contest implies a 
“presumption of knowledge” (Hayek), whereas a broadly scattered funding of small projects – 
as in the InnoRegio contest – might possibly have no effect at all, because the necessary 
‘critical levels’ are not reached. 
Furthermore, it still is unsettled whether the regional clustering of innovative activities 
in a special technology area really produces substantial positive externalities. To a significant 
extent, this depends on the position of the corresponding industry in the industrial life-cycle. 
The formation of clusters seems to be suitable for stimulating the growth of industries and 
technologies that are in an early stage of their life-cycle (like biotechnology, microprocessing 
or nanotechnology), but it seems less appropriate for mature industries and technologies.  
 
VI. Combining the prototypes: ”Innovative Regional Growth Cores“ 
 
In spring 2001 the BMBF has launched a new initiative called ”Innovative Regional 
Growth Cores“
15 that directly builds upon the experiences with the two prototype models 
discussed so far. One may argue that this new programme combines various elements of the 
two prototypes: Like the InnoRegio Contest it is restricted to east Germany, does not focus on 
a single technology and supports intraregional cooperation projects. Unlike InnoRegio – and 
in resemblance to BioRegio – the new initiative is strictly growth oriented and attaches great 
importance to the economic potential of the promoted networks. The presentation of regional 
development projects as concrete as business plans is required in order to get funding from 
this three-year, 150- million -DM–programme.  
The effort to combine the strengths of the prototype models BioRegio and InnoRegio in 
this new initiative shows that a process of learning by doing and stepwise optimisation is 
                                                 
15 The German title is “Innovative Regionale Wachstumskerne”.   17
going on in the BMBF. Nevertheless, even with regard to the new initiative ”Innovative 
Regional Growth Cores“ there remain some doubts: 
-  The restriction of the new programme to East Germany is not compatible with overall  
economic efficiency  
-  The central premise underlying the new programme is that intra-regional networking 
(or cooperation) between East German firms is the bottleneck in the development of 
“innovative growth cores” in East Germany. One might ask whether it is really 
necessary to financially support such cooperation if it is in the firms own interest. 
-  Furthermore, one might ask if it is perhaps more importat to integrate partners from 
more distant locations (e.g. from West Germany or from abroad) into these networks 
to further stimulate their growth/success. 
-  The new programme is financed with money from the German UMTS licenese 
auction. As is well-known the suppliers of cellular phone networks had to pay an 
immense amount (100 billion DM) for these licenses. Even independent observers say 
that the price was much too high and is likely to become a substantial handicap for the 
growth of the German telecommunications sector. Thus, one might argue that small-
scale technological transformation of selected regions in East  Germany is bought 
dearly by hampering the large-scale transformation of the country towards the 




As has been argued before there are good  reasons  to consider a countries spatial structure 
when designing policies  to enhance national competitiveness. However, in practice good 
policies are hard to implement. The German Federal Government has experimented with 
rather different concepts of region oriented technology policy (ROTP) and it has become clear 
that no ideal concept exists. We might, however, draw some  careful policy inferences from 
the comparison of the two prototype models of ROTP: 
i.  ROTP should  – in a spatial sense  – be as open as possible, i.e. the regions 
participating in a competition for government funding should form spontaneously 
and no regions should be excluded from this competition (i.e. there should be no 
closed shops). 
ii.  ROTP should consider Tinbergen’s law, i.e. it should not try to pursuit more 
objectives than it has instruments available.    18
iii.  ROTP should identify and build upon existing strengths of the regions; 
‘strengthening of the strong’ is more promising than subsidizing the weakest 
regions. Such a policy may increase regional disparities, although this needn’t 
always be problematic: If the strategy of upgrading national growth regions to 
international growth regions is successful it is likely that this will also benefit 
peripheral regions. 
iv.  ROTP should be complemented by a national policy creating suitable regulatory 
framework for the development and diffusion of new technologies. 
v.  As spatial clustering of innovative activities is not desirable per se  we need more 
empirical research on the long-term interrelation between spatial clustering and 
national economic growth as well as on the determinants of successful clusters.  
vi.  Interregional competition for federal funding – which is an integral part of both 
prototype models discussed here -only makes sense in countries with a dispersed 
regional innovation structure, i.e. it might be a suitable strategy f or polycentric 
countries like Germany or the US or for supra-national technology policies in the 
European Union.
16 It makes little sense in small countries or in countries with a 
monocentric regional structure such as France or the UK. 
 
    
                                                 
16 See Gehrke and Legler (2001: 36) for an overview of the concentration of innovative activities in major 
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continued 
 
1  BioTOP-Initiative Berlin-Brandenburg  6,013    10  Bioinitiative Nord  2,172 
2  Region Bremen  0.549    11  Region Nordwest- Niedersachsen  0,214 
3  BioRegio Freiburg  0.199    12  BioRegio Regensburg  0,125 
4  BioRegio Greifswald-Rostock  0,288    13  BioRegio Rheinland
a  2,165 
5  BioRegion Halle-Leipzig  0,752    14  BioRegio Rhein-Main  1,239 
6  BioRegion Jena
b  0,101    15  BioRegion Rhein-Neckar-Dreieck
a  0,616 
7  BioMIT Mittelhessen  0,149    16  BioRegion Stuttgart/Neckar-Alb  0,585 
8  Initiativkreis Biotechnologie München
a  1,236    17  BioTechnologie Ulm  0,115 
9  BioRegioN  0,901      all BioRegios  17,419 
awinning region
      b special vote   22
Table 1:   Criteria by which the model regions were chosen 
C1:  Number and scale of existing companies oriented towards biotechnology in the region 
C2:  Number, profile and productivity of biotech research facilities and universities in the region 
C3:  Interaction (networking) of different branches of biotech research in the region 
C4:  Supporting service facilities (patent office, information networks, consulting) 
C5:  Strategies to convert biotechnology know-how into new products, processes and services 
C6:  A regional concept to help the start-up of biotechnology-based companies 
C7:  Provision of resources through banks and public equity to finance biotechnology companies 
C8:  Cooperation among regional biotech research institutes and clinical hospitals in the region 
C9:  Local authorities approval practice with regard to new biotech facilities and  field experiments 
Source: BMBF (1996). 
 
Table 2: Obstacles to biotech innovation in Germany  
  Answers (in per cent) 






Insufficient technology transfer between firms and universities  50  44  6 
Lack of communication/co-operation betw. reg.  key actors  36  55  9 
Over-regulation  36  48  15 
Lacking acceptance of biotech in the public  27  55  18 
Risk averseness of German entrepreneurs  27  48  24 
Lack of venture capital  24  42  33 
Lack of research cooperation between firms  19  63  19 
Lack of public funding  15  42  42 
Lack of highly qualified researchers  6  21  73 
Source: Own survey. 
Table 3: Advantages of the BioRegio contest  
  Answers (in per cent): 






The BRC furthers ...       
... communication and cooperation among  regional key actors     70  24  6 
... evolution of an innovation prone regional environment     58  39  3 
... research cooperation within the BioRegios     48  45  6 
... interregional competition for technology     33  48  18 
... break up of innovation-hampering political and administrative 
structures. 
   21  52  27 
... faster diffusion of knowledge within the regions     21  48  30 
... intraregional competition     3  55  42 
Source: Own survey.   23
Table 4: Problems of the BioRegio contest (BRC) 
  Answers (in per cent): 






BRC doesn’t reduce regulation at the national level  50  37  13 
Neglect of less favored regions at the periphery  39  39  23 
BRC leads to free rider effects  38  50  13 
Injury to innovative firms located at peripheral regions  34  47  19 
Winning regions were known in advance  27  33  40 
Most recent developments in the regions not considered  24  42  33 
Criteria for selection of winning regions not appropriate  21  55  24 
Efficiency-deterring intervention into the market process  12  24  64 
Source: Own survey. 
Table 5: General assessment of the BioRegio contest (BRC) 
  Answers (in per cent): 
  yes  no 
Is  the BRC a successful policy instrument that should be continued with?  75  25 
Has the BRC made Germany more competitive in biotechnology?  91  9 
Has the BRC contributed to creating new jobs to a considerable degree?  72  28 
Has the BRC contributed to an improved provision of venture capital?  84  16 
Does the BRC funding reach the most innovative biotech firms in 
Germany? 
43  57 
Is interregional competition for funding a suitable means of increasing the 





Source: Own survey 
Table 6: Regional distribution of InnoRegio –applicants- and  -winners  
State (Bundesland)  applicants 
abs.  number              percentage 
winners 
abs. number            percentage 
 Berlin   35  8  1  4 
 Brandenburg   102  23  5  20 
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern   60  14  4  16 
 Sachsen   115  26  7  28 
 Sachsen-Anhalt   81  18  5  20 
 Thüringen   47  11  3  12 
Source: BMBF 1999, own calculations. 
   24
 
Table 7:    Decision criteria in the 2nd Phase of InnoRegio 
c1:    Novelty and originality of the approaches  
c2:    Impact on the region’s competitiveness and employment situation 
c3:    Dynamic (long run) potential of the projects  
c4:    Expected regional return of the projects   
c5:    Sustainability of the development induced by the projects  
c6:    Plausibility and maturity of the presented concepts 
c7:    Quality (intensity) of cooperation  
c8:    Regional embeddedness of the actors 
c9:      Financial contribution of the region itself 
c10:    Applicability of the approaches to other regions 
Source: BMBF (1999: 15). 
Table 8: Common Features of the Two Prototype Models 
Both instruments … 
… aim at stimulating clustering of innovative activities and  
      inducing a technology push 
… address the regional level in order to pursue national goals 
… employ a competition of regional units for public funding 
… install an independent jury in order to chose the winners 
… try to  improve  cooperation in regional innovation systems 
Table 9: Differences between BioRegio and InnoRegio 
BioRegio  InnoRegio 
restricted to biotechnology  not restricted to a single technology 
not restricted to particular regions  restricted to east Germany 
strengthening of the strong, dynamic regions  focussing also on problem regions 
growth objective  growth and convergence objective 
participants are (networks of) cities  participants are single projects 
small number of participating regions (17 
applications) 
large number of projects participated (440 
applications) 
“hardware“ criteria dominated  “software“ criteria dominated 
 